Re: [SECURITY] CVE-2020-9484 Apache Tomcat Remote Code Execution via session persistence

classic Classic list List threaded Threaded
3 messages Options
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: [SECURITY] CVE-2020-9484 Apache Tomcat Remote Code Execution via session persistence

emma davis
 Hi,
When I run  dns leaktest  https://www.dnsleaktest.com/I have a setup  which shows 32 Servers identifying my origin.All from  different continents
If some one  did  pen test or ethical hacking with same setup as myself using these tools for bug bounties on Tomcat. How what is the defence against such penetration attack ?

Kali Linux Tools Listing

Information Gathering
   
   - ace-voip
   - Amap
   - APT2
   - arp-scan
   - Automater
   - bing-ip2hosts
   - braa
   - CaseFile
   - CDPSnarf
   - cisco-torch
   - copy-router-config
   - DMitry
   - dnmap
   - dnsenum
   - dnsmap
   - DNSRecon
   - dnstracer
   - dnswalk
   - DotDotPwn
   - enum4linux
   - enumIAX
   - EyeWitness
   - Faraday
   - Fierce
   - Firewalk
   - fragroute
   - fragrouter
   - Ghost Phisher
   - GoLismero
   - goofile
   - hping3
   - ident-user-enum
   - InSpy
   - InTrace
   - iSMTP
   - lbd
   - Maltego Teeth
   - masscan
   - Metagoofil
   - Miranda
   - nbtscan-unixwiz
   - Nikto
   - Nmap
   - ntop
   - OSRFramework
   - p0f
   - Parsero
   - Recon-ng
   - SET
   - SMBMap
   - smtp-user-enum
   - snmp-check
   - SPARTA
   - sslcaudit
   - SSLsplit
   - sslstrip
   - SSLyze
   - Sublist3r
   - THC-IPV6
   - theHarvester
   - TLSSLed
   - twofi
   - Unicornscan
   - URLCrazy
   - Wireshark
   - WOL-E
   - Xplico

Vulnerability Analysis
   
   - BBQSQL
   - BED
   - cisco-auditing-tool
   - cisco-global-exploiter
   - cisco-ocs
   - cisco-torch
   - copy-router-config
   - Doona
   - DotDotPwn
   - HexorBase
   - jSQL Injection
   - Lynis
   - Nmap
   - ohrwurm
   - openvas
   - Oscanner
   - Powerfuzzer
   - sfuzz
   - SidGuesser
   - SIPArmyKnife
   - sqlmap
   - Sqlninja
   - sqlsus
   - THC-IPV6
   - tnscmd10g
   - unix-privesc-check
   - Yersinia

Exploitation Tools
   
   - Armitage
   - Backdoor Factory
   - BeEF
   - cisco-auditing-tool
   - cisco-global-exploiter
   - cisco-ocs
   - cisco-torch
   - Commix
   - crackle
   - exploitdb
   - jboss-autopwn
   - Linux Exploit Suggester
   - Maltego Teeth
   - Metasploit Framework
   - MSFPC
   - RouterSploit
   - SET
   - ShellNoob
   - sqlmap
   - THC-IPV6
   - Yersinia

Wireless Attacks
   
   - Airbase-ng
   - Aircrack-ng
   - Airdecap-ng and Airdecloak-ng
   - Aireplay-ng
   - airgraph-ng
   - Airmon-ng
   - Airodump-ng
   - airodump-ng-oui-update
   - Airolib-ng
   - Airserv-ng
   - Airtun-ng
   - Asleap
   - Besside-ng
   - Bluelog
   - BlueMaho
   - Bluepot
   - BlueRanger
   - Bluesnarfer
   - Bully
   - coWPAtty
   - crackle
   - eapmd5pass
   - Easside-ng
   - Fern Wifi Cracker
   - FreeRADIUS-WPE
   - Ghost Phisher
   - GISKismet
   - Gqrx
   - gr-scan
   - hostapd-wpe
   - ivstools
   - kalibrate-rtl
   - KillerBee
   - Kismet
   - makeivs-ng
   - mdk3
   - mfcuk
   - mfoc
   - mfterm
   - Multimon-NG
   - Packetforge-ng
   - PixieWPS
   - Pyrit
   - Reaver
   - redfang
   - RTLSDR Scanner
   - Spooftooph
   - Tkiptun-ng
   - Wesside-ng
   - Wifi Honey
   - wifiphisher
   - Wifitap
   - Wifite
   - wpaclean

Forensics Tools
   
   - Binwalk
   - bulk-extractor
   - Capstone
   - chntpw
   - Cuckoo
   - dc3dd
   - ddrescue
   - DFF
   - diStorm3
   - Dumpzilla
   - extundelete
   - Foremost
   - Galleta
   - Guymager
   - iPhone Backup Analyzer
   - p0f
   - pdf-parser
   - pdfid
   - pdgmail
   - peepdf
   - RegRipper
   - Volatility
   - Xplico

Web Applications
   
   - apache-users
   - Arachni
   - BBQSQL
   - BlindElephant
   - Burp Suite
   - CutyCapt
   - DAVTest
   - deblaze
   - DIRB
   - DirBuster
   - fimap
   - FunkLoad
   - Gobuster
   - Grabber
   - hURL
   - jboss-autopwn
   - joomscan
   - jSQL Injection
   - Maltego Teeth
   - Nikto
   - PadBuster
   - Paros
   - Parsero
   - plecost
   - Powerfuzzer
   - ProxyStrike
   - Recon-ng
   - Skipfish
   - sqlmap
   - Sqlninja
   - sqlsus
   - ua-tester
   - Uniscan
   - w3af
   - WebScarab
   - Webshag
   - WebSlayer
   - WebSploit
   - Wfuzz
   - WhatWeb
   - WPScan
   - XSSer
   - zaproxy

Stress Testing
   
   - DHCPig
   - FunkLoad
   - iaxflood
   - Inundator
   - inviteflood
   - ipv6-toolkit
   - mdk3
   - Reaver
   - rtpflood
   - SlowHTTPTest
   - t50
   - Termineter
   - THC-IPV6
   - THC-SSL-DOS

Sniffing & Spoofing
   
   - bettercap
   - Burp Suite
   - DNSChef
   - fiked
   - hamster-sidejack
   - HexInject
   - iaxflood
   - inviteflood
   - iSMTP
   - isr-evilgrade
   - mitmproxy
   - ohrwurm
   - protos-sip
   - rebind
   - responder
   - rtpbreak
   - rtpinsertsound
   - rtpmixsound
   - sctpscan
   - SIPArmyKnife
   - SIPp
   - SIPVicious
   - SniffJoke
   - SSLsplit
   - sslstrip
   - THC-IPV6
   - VoIPHopper
   - WebScarab
   - Wifi Honey
   - Wireshark
   - xspy
   - Yersinia
   - zaproxy

Password Attacks
   
   - BruteSpray
   - Burp Suite
   - CeWL
   - chntpw
   - cisco-auditing-tool
   - CmosPwd
   - creddump
   - crowbar
   - crunch
   - findmyhash
   - gpp-decrypt
   - hash-identifier
   - Hashcat
   - HexorBase
   - THC-Hydra
   - John the Ripper
   - Johnny
   - keimpx
   - Maltego Teeth
   - Maskprocessor
   - multiforcer
   - Ncrack
   - oclgausscrack
   - ophcrack
   - PACK
   - patator
   - phrasendrescher
   - polenum
   - RainbowCrack
   - rcracki-mt
   - RSMangler
   - SecLists
   - SQLdict
   - Statsprocessor
   - THC-pptp-bruter
   - TrueCrack
   - WebScarab
   - wordlists
   - zaproxy

Maintaining Access
   
   - CryptCat
   - Cymothoa
   - dbd
   - dns2tcp
   - HTTPTunnel
   - Intersect
   - Nishang
   - polenum
   - PowerSploit
   - pwnat
   - RidEnum
   - sbd
   - shellter
   - U3-Pwn
   - Webshells
   - Weevely
   - Winexe

Hardware Hacking
   
   - android-sdk
   - apktool
   - Arduino
   - dex2jar
   - Sakis3G
   - smali

Reverse Engineering
   
   - apktool
   - dex2jar
   - diStorm3
   - edb-debugger
   - jad
   - javasnoop
   - JD-GUI
   - OllyDbg
   - smali
   - Valgrind
   - YARA

Reporting Tools
   
   - CaseFile
   - cherrytree
   - CutyCapt
   - dos2unix
   - Dradis
   - MagicTree
   - Metagoofil
   - Nipper-ng
   - pipal
   - RDPY

 

emma davis
[hidden email]
 
 
-----Original Message-----
From: Mark Thomas <[hidden email]>
To: Tomcat Users List <[hidden email]>
CC: Tomcat Developers List <[hidden email]>; [hidden email] <[hidden email]>; [hidden email]
Sent: Wed, 20 May 2020 16:19
Subject: [SECURITY] CVE-2020-9484 Apache Tomcat Remote Code Execution via session persistence

CVE-2020-9484 Apache Tomcat Remote Code Execution via session persistence

Severity: High

Vendor: The Apache Software Foundation

Versions Affected:
Apache Tomcat 10.0.0-M1 to 10.0.0-M4
Apache Tomcat 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.34
Apache Tomcat 8.5.0 to 8.5.54
Apache Tomcat 7.0.0 to 7.0.103

Description:
If:
a) an attacker is able to control the contents and name of a file on the
  server; and
b) the server is configured to use the PersistenceManager with a
  FileStore; and
c) the PersistenceManager is configured with
  sessionAttributeValueClassNameFilter="null" (the default unless a
  SecurityManager is used) or a sufficiently lax filter to allow the
  attacker provided object to be deserialized; and
d) the attacker knows the relative file path from the storage location
  used by FileStore to the file the attacker has control over;
then, using a specifically crafted request, the attacker will be able to
trigger remote code execution via deserialization of the file under
their control. Note that all of conditions a) to d) must be true for the
attack to succeed.

Mitigation:
- Upgrade to Apache Tomcat 10.0.0-M5 or later
- Upgrade to Apache Tomcat 9.0.35 or later
- Upgrade to Apache Tomcat 8.5.55 or later
- Upgrade to Apache Tomcat 7.0.104 or later
Alternatively, users may configure the PersistenceManager with an
appropriate value for sessionAttributeValueClassNameFilter to ensure
that only application provided attributes are serialized and deserialized.

Credit:
This issue was discovered and reported responsibly to the Apache Tomcat
Security Team by report by jarvis threedr3am of pdd security research

References:
[1] http://tomcat.apache.org/security-10.html
[2] http://tomcat.apache.org/security-9.html
[3] http://tomcat.apache.org/security-8.html
[4] http://tomcat.apache.org/security-7.html

---------------------------------------------------------------------
To unsubscribe, e-mail: [hidden email]
For additional commands, e-mail: [hidden email]

Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: [SECURITY] CVE-2020-9484 Apache Tomcat Remote Code Execution via session persistence

Stefan Mayr-2
Hi,

Am 20.05.2020 um 17:19 schrieb Mark Thomas:

> CVE-2020-9484 Apache Tomcat Remote Code Execution via session persistence
>
> Severity: High
>
> Vendor: The Apache Software Foundation
>
> Versions Affected:
> Apache Tomcat 10.0.0-M1 to 10.0.0-M4
> Apache Tomcat 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.34
> Apache Tomcat 8.5.0 to 8.5.54
> Apache Tomcat 7.0.0 to 7.0.103
>
> Description:
> If:
> a) an attacker is able to control the contents and name of a file on the
>    server; and
> b) the server is configured to use the PersistenceManager with a
>    FileStore; and
> c) the PersistenceManager is configured with
>    sessionAttributeValueClassNameFilter="null" (the default unless a
>    SecurityManager is used) or a sufficiently lax filter to allow the
>    attacker provided object to be deserialized; and
> d) the attacker knows the relative file path from the storage location
>    used by FileStore to the file the attacker has control over;
> then, using a specifically crafted request, the attacker will be able to
> trigger remote code execution via deserialization of the file under
> their control. Note that all of conditions a) to d) must be true for the
> attack to succeed.
>

Assuming an attacker can do (a), (d) and the Tomcat instance is running
with a default configuration (c): is the StandardManager vulnerable or
not (b)?

Also a question about naming: is PersistenceManager the same
PersistentManager as in org.apache.catalina.session.PersistentManager?
So a vulnerable configuration would need to use something like

<Manager className="org.apache.catalina.session.PersistentManager">
  <Store className="org.apache.catalina.session.FileStore" />
</Manager>

Regards,

  Stefan Mayr


---------------------------------------------------------------------
To unsubscribe, e-mail: [hidden email]
For additional commands, e-mail: [hidden email]

Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: [SECURITY] CVE-2020-9484 Apache Tomcat Remote Code Execution via session persistence

markt
On May 24, 2020 4:49:50 PM UTC, Stefan Mayr <[hidden email]> wrote:

>Hi,
>
>Am 20.05.2020 um 17:19 schrieb Mark Thomas:
>> CVE-2020-9484 Apache Tomcat Remote Code Execution via session
>persistence
>>
>> Severity: High
>>
>> Vendor: The Apache Software Foundation
>>
>> Versions Affected:
>> Apache Tomcat 10.0.0-M1 to 10.0.0-M4
>> Apache Tomcat 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.34
>> Apache Tomcat 8.5.0 to 8.5.54
>> Apache Tomcat 7.0.0 to 7.0.103
>>
>> Description:
>> If:
>> a) an attacker is able to control the contents and name of a file on
>the
>>    server; and
>> b) the server is configured to use the PersistenceManager with a
>>    FileStore; and
>> c) the PersistenceManager is configured with
>>    sessionAttributeValueClassNameFilter="null" (the default unless a
>>    SecurityManager is used) or a sufficiently lax filter to allow the
>>    attacker provided object to be deserialized; and
>> d) the attacker knows the relative file path from the storage
>location
>>    used by FileStore to the file the attacker has control over;
>> then, using a specifically crafted request, the attacker will be able
>to
>> trigger remote code execution via deserialization of the file under
>> their control. Note that all of conditions a) to d) must be true for
>the
>> attack to succeed.
>>
>
>Assuming an attacker can do (a), (d) and the Tomcat instance is running
>with a default configuration (c): is the StandardManager vulnerable or
>not (b)?

No.

>Also a question about naming: is PersistenceManager the same
>PersistentManager as in org.apache.catalina.session.PersistentManager?

Yes.

>So a vulnerable configuration would need to use something like
>
><Manager className="org.apache.catalina.session.PersistentManager">
>  <Store className="org.apache.catalina.session.FileStore" />
></Manager>

Yes.

Mark



---------------------------------------------------------------------
To unsubscribe, e-mail: [hidden email]
For additional commands, e-mail: [hidden email]